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Abstract. In this paper we investigate the problem of automatically naming pieces of assembly code. Where by
naming we mean assigning to an assembly function a string of words that would likely be assigned by a human
reverse engineer. We formally and precisely define the framework in which our investigation takes place. That is
we define the problem, we provide reasonable justifications for the choices that we made for the design of training
and the tests. We performed an analysis on a large real-world corpora constituted by nearly 9 millions of functions
taken from more than 22k softwares. In such framework we test baselines coming from the field of Natural Language
Processing (e.g., Seq2Seq networks and Transformer). Interestingly, our evaluation shows promising results beating
the state-of-the-art and reaching good performance. We investigate the applicability of tine-tuning (i.e., taking a
model already trained on a large generic corpora and retraining it for a specific task). Such technique is popular
and well-known in the NLP field. Our results confirm that fine-tuning is effective even when neural networks are
applied to binaries. We show that a model, pre-trained on the aforementioned corpora, when fine-tuned has higher
performances on specific domains (such as predicting names in system utilites, malware, etc).
Keywords: Reverse engineering · Function naming · Binary analysis · Dataset.
1 Introduction
Last few years have witnessed the growth of a trend consisting in the application of machine learning (ML) and
natural language processing (NLP) techniques to the code analysis field, as illustrated in [14]. In fact, the vast and
increasing number of high quality software available through open source repositories such as GitHub, has given the
chance to leverage large amount of source code as a ground truth for building statistical models of code. The design
choice of using NLP to build such models is motivated by the naturalness hypothesis which underlines the similarities
between programming languages and human languages. According to this hypothesis, software is a form of human
communication with similar statistical properties to natural language and these properties can be exploited to build
better software engineering tools [14]. The practice of applying ML and NLP techniques to code turned out to be very
helpful and effective in many tasks such as predicting program bugs [7], predicting identifier names [19], translating
code between programming languages [6], etc. Thus, the success given by the application of NLP techniques to source
code has led to investigate the possible use of such techniques also in the context of binary code analysis; learning
function signatures [23], identifying similar functions [10,16,22], recovering the compiler that generated a given binary
[15], just to cite a few.
Following this research line, in this paper we investigate the feasibility of using similar techniques to predict
the name of functions in stripped binary programs. The latter are binary executable files that only contain low-level
information such as instructions, registers and memory addresses but no debug symbols since they are not directly
necessary for program execution. Debug symbols are generated by compiler programs on the basis of the source
code and typically include information about functions and variables, such as name, location, type and size which are
helpful for debugging and security analysis of a binary. Being non essential for the software execution, symbols are
often removed from a program after compilation, increasing the complexity of reverse engineer the software.
Reconstructing symbols in a binary program can be a very useful feature for all those field where reverse engineer-
ing code plays a crucial role, e.g. malware analysis. Usually, after having disassembled a malware the reverse engineer
starts analyzing the set of assembly instructions of the program looking for specific functions (e.g. encryption or net-
work) that might reveal the malicious nature of the software sample under investigation. This task could be daunting,
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especially when the binary code is stripped and original function names are not present. In this case, it could be very
helpful having explanatory names for such functions, as they would save a lot of effort to the reverser whose work
could be guided and supported by clear hints about the content of each function.
Recently, a few works proposed solutions to this problem. For example, [11] and [8] have shown promising results
in predicting functions names. However, the problem at hand is far from being solved as existing solutions work only
under strong assumptions, like the presence of symbolic calls to dynamically linked libraries in each functions [8], or
a closed set of possible assignable names to predict from [11]. Furthermore, existing solutions have only be evaluated
on small datasets that contain binary programs with little variance (less than 1k softwares), and this datasets have not
been made publicly available, hindering the possibility to compare existing solutions.
Starting from these issues in this paper we propose the following contributions:
– Dataset. We created a new dataset, namely UbuntuDataset, composed by a large number of real world binaries,
spannig several heterogeneous application fields: networking, databases, video-games, system utilities, c libraries,
etc. Our dataset contains 8.8 millions functions from 22k distinct softwares. The dataset is made available online
to the community for testing and evaluation.
– Competitive DNN solutions. Considering the function naming problem, we train and test two Deep Neural Net-
work architectures Seq2Seq and Transformer. We achieve an f1-score of 0.122 for Seq2Seq and of 0.230 for
Transformer. We compare our architectures with previous solutions on a subset of our test set, showing an im-
provement with respect to the state-of-the-art.
– Fine-tuning. We show that a model trained on our UbuntuDataset has a drastic performance improvement when
fine-tuned for a specific domain. Fine-tuning [9] is a popular technique in NLP, in which models trained on huge
general purpose datasets are then re-trained on a smaller dataset specialised for a certain sub-task. In this paper
we show that fine-tuning works also when applied on models for binary code: we found a marked improvement
of our model when fine-tuned to name applications of a specific domain (such as system utilities). In particular,
we show that a model fine-tuned on busybox has a relative improvement of 22% when tested on coreutils with
respect to a pre-trained model with no fine-tuning. We also show that fine-tuning helps the network in having better
performances when naming functions across different optimisations. That is, we fine-tune our network on certain
set of packages compiled with optimisation flag O0 and then we show that this leads to a two-fold improvement
when naming the same packages compiled with O1,O2, and O3. We also compare all our fine-tuned models to
models that are trained from scratch only on the specific fine-tuning dataset. As expected, these latter models have
lower performances. This shows that fine-tuning is able to exploit and refine the knowledge learnt on large general
datasets of binaries, but the specific training sets used for this purpose do not contain enough information to learn
from scratch the correct relationships name-assembly code.
– Test on Malware. We test our solution on real world linux malware in a quantitative and qualitative way. Also in
this case we test performances with and without fine-tuning, showing a 5-fold performance improvement in the
former case.
After this introduction, Section 2 discusses the state of the art, Section 3 introduces the function naming problem,
Section 4 describes the UbuntuDataset used for the evaluation, Section 5 details the proposed solutions. Section 6
reports the experimental results on goodware, and Section 7 reports our tests on malware. Finally, Section 8 concludes
the paper.
2 Related Work
There are several works on predicting names for variables, functions and objects using statistical learning.
2.1 Prediction of Variables, and Function Names in High Level Languages
A body of works have explored the possibility of predicting variable, function and object names within code expressed
in high-level programming languages (such as Java, Javascript, C and similars), the majority of which leverage deep
learning techniques. In [2] a word2vec-like approach is used to learn a probability distribution on class and method
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names. The model can then be used to suggest probable names for classes, methods and variables in Java source
code. In [3] convolutional neural networks are used to create extremely summarised descriptions of Java functions that
resemble function names. Code2seq [4] proposes an encoder-decoder strategy on the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) of
functions to obtain explanative sentences, so called “code captions”, of C# functions and Java methods. Finally, [20]
uses conditional random fields to predict names of variables and methods in large Javascript programs.
This line of works leverages the huge amount of information that is available with high level code (e.g. variable
types, other names, etc.), information that are not present in compiled binary code. Therefore, directly applying these
methodologies to our work is unfeasible.
2.2 Prediction of Variables, and Function Names in Binary Code
Predicting debugging symbols, including function names, through ML is a rather new field of research with few
contributions. The most notable work in this area is DEBIN, proposed by He et al. [11]. It uses conditional random
fields to predict debug symbols. similarly to [20] it also predicts function names, variable names and types. Differently
from our work, DEBIN is only able to assign to functions names from a predetermined closed set, i.e. it cannot
generalise to new names. The dataset used in [11] to evaluate DEBIN is composed by 9k executables from 830 linux
packages.
DEBIN’s limitation is surpassed by a recent pre-print, NERO [8], which models the problem of predicting function
names as a Neural Machine Translation (NMT) task where each function is represented by “call sites sequences”:
each call site is an encoding of a function call containing the name of the called function and information on the
parameters. Unfortunately, it is not clear how NERO will cope with functions that do not use calls, since it seems
that no feature is extracted in this case. Additionally, by taking into consideration only calls to external library, their
method is likely to miss the difference functions that rely on the same set of api calls but are constituted by markedly
patterns of instructions (e.g., encryption functions and sorting functions implemented from scratch). Their source code
and dataset have not been released yet3 and their evaluation is done on a rather small set of functions (less than 15k
functions).
Finally, DIRE [13] proposes a probabilistic technique for variables name recovery that uses both lexical and struc-
tural information recovered by using a decompiler. DIRE uses the decompilers internal AST representation, which
encodes additional structural information, to train a neural network based on an encoder-decoder structure, where the
encoder is composed by a bidirectional-LSTM and a graph encoder and the decoder is a standard LSTM. Their entire
dataset contains 1259k functions, with a test set of 120k functions. We remark that recovering variables name is a
different task than ours, and that function names are used in DIRE to help in predicting the name of variables.
3 Framework and Problem definition
3.1 Problem Definition
Given a fragment of binary code b representing a functional unit of code (for simplicity, and without loss of generality,
we assume it corresponds to a function) in a compiled software, we want to output a string s. Such string s has to
represent a “meaningful” name for function b, that is a name that captures its semantic and its role inside the software.
The above problem is extremely challenging, and, due to its nature, cannot be defined more precisely without
incurring in complex reasoning about what is the “semantic” of code. Fortunately, statistical learning methods are
especially suitable for problems where the definition itself is fuzzy. As customary in statistical approaches we will try
to learn a probability distribution that assigns to each function b the most probable output string s using a large dataset
of assembly functions with semantically expressive names.
Our investigation of the function naming problem is based on a set of simplifying assumptions that made the
training and testing phase tractable. In the following we precisely state all our assumptions, providing the reasoning
behind our design, and we describe the main challenges of the problem.
3 The pre-print arXiv version:https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.09122v2 mentions a public available dataset. Although, no link to the
dataset is present.
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3.2 Training
Statistical methods, especially the ones based on neural networks, are effective when trained on a suitable dataset of
relatively large size (millions of functions). In a dataset that counts millions of functions it would be unreasonable to
manually annotate each one with a representative name. Therefore, in this paper we assume the following:
Assumption 1 (Sensible programmer) A programmer, when writing code in an high-level language, assigns names to
functions that represent their semantics and their role inside the software.
The above assumption does not always hold true. However, we find reasonable to assume that it holds most of
the time, especially, in large projects developed by professional or skilled programmers and where common naming
conventions are often used and enforced. This assumption allows us to create a dataset by disassembling the binary
code from open source projects, without the need to perform manual annotation as function names are available in the
source code.
3.3 Testing
There is an unavoidable ambiguity in the output of any method that names something: in general several different
meaningful descriptive names can be associated to a given piece of code. As an example, a function implementing
quick sort on an array could be named “Quick-sort”, “quick-array-sort”, “sort”, etc. This creates a problem in the way
our solution is tested: in order to evaluate its real accuracy we should consider all possible meaningful names, but this
is, again, unfeasible.
Therefore, as common in the NLP literature [5,18], we will say that a prediction is correct if it is the same name
present in the dataset. In our case we will measure the performance using the classical metrics of precision, recall and
F1. The drawback of this evaluation methodology is that other predictions will be deemed as wrong even if they are
meaningful.
3.4 Vocabulary and Restricted Names
Unfortunately, we found that functions names in our dataset are noisy, as example many functions of the OpenGL
library contain the bigram “gl”. Such pattern is recurrent in many libraries and softwares; this is due to the fact that
developers use words and acronyms that have the meaning of identifying the software itself, but that do not add much
to the semantic of the function. In order to clean our dataset we designed a filtering process (described in a detailed
way in Section 4). This filtering process has the purpose of associating each original name to a reduced name over a
restricted vocabulary of words (whose size was around 1k words in our experiments). We found that such restriction
preserves the semantic of the majority of names in our dataset and it solves the problem described above.
4 The UbuntuDataset
In this section we describe our dataset, and the steps used for its construction. The dataset can be found at the following
URL redacted4.
4.1 Dataset Building Process
UbuntuDataset was built by downloading all available amd64 packages from the Ubuntu 19.04 apt repositories 5.
We collected a total of 22040 packages; for each package, when available, we downloaded the corresponding debug
symbols and extracted all the executables files. At the end of this process we got 87853 distinct ELF files that we
disassembled with IDA Pro. We then filtered out duplicated functions6 and we discarded functions for which we
4 The URL for downloading the dataset will be uploaded shortly.
5 Namely, main, restricted, universe and multiverse.
6 Two functions are duplicate if they contain the same list of instructions after the substitution of constants and memory addresses
with a dummy value.
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failed to get a symbolic name in the debug symbols repository. At the end of this process we got 10005866 distinct
named functions. These functions have been additionally filtered by a process described below, and at the end we
obtained nearly 9 millions usable functions that constitute our Training, Validation and Test dataset. Table 1 reports
a comparison among datasets used by papers that address (directly or indirectly) the function naming problem on
binaries.
Table 1. Comparison of datasets used by function naming papers. (**) The paper does not report the total number of functions, but
it reports an average of 79 functions per binary file and a total number of 9000 binaries. (*): Nero pre-print [8] mentions a public
dataset but no link to it is provided.
Paper #softwares #functions Operating system Released
UbuntuDataset (Our) 22040 8861407 Ubuntu 19.04 Repositories yes
Debin [11] 830 711k Ext. (**) Ubuntu No
Nero [8] Unknown 15k Linux Generic No (*)
4.2 Function Representation
In UbuntuDataset each function is represented by its linear list of instructions. The relative order in the list is given
by the address of each instruction inside the program. The average number of instructions per function is 159.12; we
truncated all functions with more than 500 instructions and we removed all functions with less than 5 instructions.
4.3 From Function Names to Tokens
We apply a normalization process to function names whose final goal is to represent each of them as a list of tokens in
a reference vocabulary. The process of normalisation is based on six steps:
1. Demangling
2. Splitting
3. Stemming
4. Vocabulary construction
5. Final conversion
Demangling. The names contained in the debug symbol table have been mangled by the compiler for various reasons
(e.g, implementing methods overriding). The aim of this first step is to recover the original function names. Since
compilers perform mangling in a standard way, it is possible to perform name demangling using standard libraries
7. During this step we filtered all the binary functions deriving from source code written in languages different from
C/C++ (e.g. GO, Haskell, etc.).
Splitting. This step consists in splitting function names into tokens. This is achieved by using the natural partition
provided by camelcase and snake notations, which are generally adopted for function names.
Stemming. This is a technique used in information retrieval to reduce inflected (or sometimes derived) words to their
base form. Nevertheless, such technique turns out to be very useful in this context, since it has the effect of reducing
the vocabulary by mapping different forms of the same token into a unique one (for example the tokens “shared” and
“sharing” are both mapped to their base form “share”). Stemming is important since it is not necessary for the network
to learn the syntactically correct token to associate to each function, but rather the semantically correct one.
7 In particular, we used cxxfilt:https://github.com/afq984/python-cxxfilt
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(b) Log-log scale plot of the frequency of all tokens in our vocab-
ulary.
Fig. 1. Statistical analysis of the vocabulary.
Vocabulary construction. This step consists in creating a meaningful vocabulary of tokens. This operation has the goal
of removing useless and meaningless tokens from function names (e.g., many functions in the gnu scientific library
starts with the token “gsl”). The token selection process consists first in assigning a score to each token and then
retaining only tokens whose score is above a certain threshold τ . The score for each token t is the project frequency,
that is the number of different packages in which a token appears. This choice permit us to exclude tokens that appear
only in few packages independently from the frequency of the token inside the package. In this way we avoid to assign
a large score to tokens that are not semantically relevant (see the aforementioned example of the “gsl” token). We set
τ to 500 obtaining 1080 tokens. Finally, we exclude from the vocabulary all token that have no meaning ending up
with a vocabulary of 1064 tokens.
Final conversion. This final step consists in removing from function names all those tokens not contained in the
vocabulary built in the previous step. Moreover, this step is also designed to split function names that are not using
the camelcase or snake notation. The idea is to split tokens in case they match a word in our vocabulary, as example
the token “numpy” matches the vocabulary word “num”, therefore we transform it in the token “num”; the token
“numvertex” is transformed in “num” and “vertex”. There are few cases in which function names only consist of out-
of-vocabulary tokens resulting in an empty name; in such cases functions are removed from the dataset. At the end
of the entire normalisation process we filtered out 11% of the initial functions and we obtained nearly 9 millions of
functions.
Statistical analysis of function names. We performed some basic analysis on the names contained in UbuntuDataset.
The average numbers of tokens in a name is 2.7. The 98% of all names is composed by 8 tokens or less. The frequency
distribution of the 25 most frequent token is in Figure 1a, while in Figure 1b we report the log-log plot of the frequency
of all tokens in our vocabulary. It is not surprising that get and set are predominant tokens, this is due to their frequent
use in objected oriented programming paradigm. Furthermore, most of the words are likely distributed according to a
power law distribution, this is consistent with the distribution of words in human languages (as example the english
words seems to follow a Zipf-law [17]). However, such fit is not perfect: in the log-log plot the tails of the distribution
(the highest and lowest frequency words) do not fit a linear interpolation.
4.4 Train, Validation, and Test Splits
In order to train and evaluate the models we split the dataset in the canonical Train, Validation and Test sets. We
put 80% of functions in the Training set, 10% in the Validation set and 10% in the Test set (ie. Train set size:
7064820,Validation set size: 944263, Test set size: 852324). We avoid information leakage by splitting functions
by packages: all functions from a given package belong to only one of the three sets.
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5 Solution Overview
In this section we describe the solutions we tested. We considered two different Deep Neural Network models: Seq2Seq
and Transformer. Both architectures take as input the set of normalised instructions that constitute a functions and
output a prediction of its name token by token.
5.1 Instruction Normalisation
All our architectures take as input the sequence of normalised assembly instructions. Instructions are normalised with
the purpose of reducing their total number by removing mostly unnecessary information. We follow a normalisation
process similar to the one proposed in [16]: we replace all base memory addresses with the special symbol MEM
and all immediates whose absolute value is above some threshold (we use 5000 in our experiments) with the special
symbol IMM. We do so because raw operands are of small benefit; for instance, the displacement given by a jump
is useless (e.g., instructions do not carry with them their memory address), and, it may worsen performances by
artificially inflating the number of different instructions. In our normalisation the instruction mov EBX,6000 becomes
mov EBX,IMM, mov EBX,[0x3435423] becomes mov EBX,MEM, while the instruction mov EAX,[EBP−8] is not
modified.
5.2 Sequence Transduction Models
Sequence Transduction Models are usually used to solve NLP problems such as Neural Machine Translation (NMT).
These models take as input a sequence terms and output a transducted sequence. These architectures are natural
candidates for our problem due to its similarity with the translation task; in our task we are essentially translating from
assembly code to small sets of tokens in human language. Generally, NMT models are composed by an encoder that
takes the input sequences and return a set of statuses c and a decoder that takes c and output the probability of an
output sequence Y :
p(Y ) =
T∏
t=1
p(y(t)|yi, ..., yt−1, c)) (1)
In NMT-like tasks, to generate the output sequence, at each time step t the model outputs a probability distribution
over the output vocabulary.
Seq2Seq Model. We use the Seq2Seq architecture proposed in [5]: the encoder consists of a bidirectional RNN with
Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) cells. The use of a bidirectional encoder is important since it allows to compute
for each instruction an hidden state vector that takes into account the instruction itself and its previous and following
context. The decoder is a forward RNN connected to the encoder by an attention mechanism that allows to better
model long distance dependencies which represent a critical aspect in assembly code.
Parameters for Seq2Seq model. We used an embedding size of 256 for the input and output tokens. For the encoder we
used a two layers bidirectional RNN with hidden state size of 256. Equally for the decoder we used a unidirectional
RNN with hidden state size of 256. Encoder and Decoder were connected using Bahdanau attention [5]. The total
number of parameters for the Seq2Seq model is 52618793. The inference step uses a beam-search strategy with beam
size 1. We used the implementation provided by OpenNMT-py 8.
Transformer. The Transformer[1] is an encoder-decoder architecture entirely based on attention mechanism. The
network consists of a set of N stacked encoders and a set of N stacked decoders. The encoder is composed of a stack
of N identical layers. The bottom-most layer is fed with the embedding vectors of the input sequence, whereas all
the other layers are fed with the output of the previous encoder. Each layer consists of two sub-layers: a multi-head
self-attention mechanism used to understand which are the relevant tokens in the input sequence and a fully connected
feed-forward network independently applied to each position. In the same way, the decoder is composed of a stack of
N identical layers. Each layer consists of three sub-layers: a masked multi-headed mechanism over the decoder input,
another multi head attention over the encoder stack output and a final feed forward layer.
8 https://github.com/OpenNMT/OpenNMT-py
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Parameters for Transformer model. We used an embedding size of 256 for the input and output tokens. For the encoder
we used 6 encoding layers with 8 heads of attention, hidden state size of 256 and hidden feed forward size of 2048.
We used the same values for the decoder. The total number of parameters for this model is 67482921. The inference
step uses a beam-search strategy with beam size 1. We used the implementation provided by OpenNMT-py.
6 Evaluation
In this section we describe our tests on non-malware binaries. Our evaluation is divided in three main tests. The first
experiment is used to train our architectures and select the best performing one. In the other two tests we investigate the
performance of our best performing architecture on specific applications, and we test the benefit of using fine-tuning
to increase its performance.
Fine-tuning. This is a really popular technique in NLP [12], that proved extremely effective when applied on models
that are derived from the Transformer and trained on extremely large general purpose datasets [9]. The main idea is
that a model trained on a large general purpose dataset will learn general related patterns with a given distribution, in
our case the ones between assembly code and natural language words. However, specific tasks may be characterized
by small datasets with differet distributions. Fine-tuning the pre-trained model on such smaller dataset often leads to
high performance tailored models for the specific task at hand.
Tests roadmap. In details the test are:
– UbuntuDataset Training and Test: we train and test the Seq2Seq and Transformer architectures using the Ubun-
tuDataset. Moreover, on a subset of UbuntuDataset we compare the Transformer with DEBIN. The best perform-
ing model of this test is the Transformer. In the other tests we will investigate how the Transformer trained on
UbuntuDataset, namely TransformerPT, performs on specific tasks, with and without fine-tuning.
– MultiOpt Test: we evaluate the performance of TransformerPT on a dataset composed by several applications
compiled with 4 different optimisation levels -O(0 − 4) and several compilers. Specifically, we test if the fine-
tuning on a certain optimisation level increases the performance on the other levels.
– SameDomain Test: we test if the fine-tuning performed on a specific application, namely busybox, increases the
performance on a different but similar application, namely the coreutils binaries. The idea is to see if re-training the
TransformerPT on an application for a certain subdomain (in this case system utilities) increases its performance
on an application of the same domain.
Evaluation Metrics. Following [8], we use as evaluation metrics the classical precision (P ), recall (R) and f1-score
(F1). More precisely, given the set of vocabulary words in the actual name x : {x1, x2, ..., xn}, and the set of tokens
in the prediction xˆ : {xˆ1, xˆ2, ..., xˆn}, we define a membership function as:
α(xˆi, x) =
{
1 if xˆi ∈ x
0 else (2)
and we compute precision, recall and f1-score as:
P =
∑
i α(xˆi, x)
|xˆ| (3) R =
∑
i α(xˆi, x)
|x| (4) F1 = 2
P +R
P ∗R (5)
6.1 UbuntuDataset: Training and Test
Training. We trained each model on the Train set from UbuntuDataset for a maximum of 30 epochs. We used a batch
size of 512, and Adam optimizer with decaying learning rate. After each training epoch we evaluate the performance
of the model on the Validation set. We used an early stopping mechanism, stopping the training when the f1-score
on the Validation set does not decrease for more than 2 epochs. We took the model with the highest f1-score on the
Validation set and tested it on the Test set.
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Results. The results are in Table 2; the Transformer outperforms Seq2Seq reaching an f1-score of 0.230 against 0.122
from Seq2Seq. As observed also in [11], it is likely that such measures are underestimating the real performance of
our system, the reasons have been described in Section 3.3. In our qualitative evaluation on malware (Section 7.2) we
have findings that confirm this hypothesis.
Table 2. Results on UbuntuDataset Test set
prec. rec. f1
Seq2Seq 0.174 0.095 0.122
Transformer 0.269 0.200 0.230
Comparison with DEBIN. We compared our solution with DEBIN and RANDOM. We did not compare our solution
with NERO since their solution has not been released. RANDOM is a basic prediction strategy in which tokens are
randomly associated to functions with a probability that respects their frequency in the training set (as an example,
“get” will be sampled more frequently than “socket”). This kind of strategy has a slight edge on the pure random one.
Note that we used DEBIN as released, that is we do not trained their model from scratch on the UbuntuDataset.
The comparison has been performed on a subset of our Test set. We took all the binaries contained in our Test
set, for each binary we used DEBIN to get a table of the missing debug symbols. We discarded all binaries for which
DEBIN was crashing or taking more than 30 minutes to analyse. We then took all predictions for functions that were
not in the symbol table of the original files, this is because DEBIN does not predict symbols that are already present in
the symbol table of the binary (e.g., exported functions). At the end of this process we obtained 49275 functions. For
each of these functions we took the name predicted by DEBIN and we normalised it using the vocabulary described
in Section 4.3, obtaining for each name a set of representative tokens.
Results. Results from this test are in Table 3. We can see that all solutions are markedly better than the RANDOM
strategy. On this dataset the Transformer outperforms the other solutions reaching an f1-score of 0.194, beating DE-
BIN 0.046 and Seq2Seq 0.108. We note that the relatively low value of DEBIN is not necessarily in contrast with
what reported in [11]; their tests are done for the entire naming category, that includes not only the task of naming
functions but also the one of naming variables. Variable names reuse common patterns (as an example fd, file, f are
standard variable names for files), and this could justify an higher rating than the one obtained by looking only at their
performances on function names.
Table 3. Results and comparison with DEBIN on DEBIN-Test subset containing 48k functions.
Prec. Rec. f1
RANDOM 0.008 0.008 0.008
DEBIN 0.047 0.046 0.046
Seq2Seq 0.144 0.086 0.108
Transformer 0.229 0.176 0.199
6.2 MultiOpt Test
Table 4. Results on MultipleCompilers Dataset for MultiOpt test.
O1 - f1 O2 - f1 O3 - f1
TransformerPT (w/o Fine-tuning) 0.134 0.145 0.142
Transformer Fine-tuned 0.261 0.275 0.276
Transformer Scratch 0.104 0.094 0.093
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MultipleCompilers Dataset. We used the dataset of [15] that contains different packages compiled with 9 different
compilers9 and optimization levels from O0 to O3. On this dataset we selected three packages: binutils-2.30, coreutils-
2.29, curl-7.61.0. We split functions in four folds, one for each optimization level. We used the fold with O0 for fine-
tuning the pre-trained model. Note that we filtered out duplicated functions: fold O0 does not include the functions
contained in the other three folds. After the filtering, fold O0 contains 76727 functions, fold O1 contains 61651
functions, fold O2 contains 46842 functions, and fold O3 contains 43930 functions. The results for this dataset are
reported in Table 4.
Results without fine-tuning. We took the TransformerPT pre-trained on UbuntuDataset and we used it to predict the
names of functions in folds O1,O2,O3. Interestingly, the model shows the best performances on higher optimizations.
We argue that this is probably due to the fact that the majority of packages in ubuntu repositories are compiled with
higher optimization. Therefore, the pre-trained model performs better on these kind of functions since they contain
patterns observed in the training phase.
Results with fine-tuning. We fine-tune the pre-trained TransformerPT for 5 epochs using the functions compiled with
optimization O0. After the fine-tuning we predict the name for the functions with other optimization levels. The results
clearly show the benefits of fine-tuning: the f1-score of the fine-tuned Transformer on all the optimization levels is
close to 2x the one from the non-fine-tuned model.
Results when training from scratch. Using the O0 fold we trained a transformer model from scratch. We use
functions with optimization O1 as Validation set. As for our pre-trained model we stopped the training after 24 epochs
when the f1-score on the Validation set did not grow for more than 2 epochs. The maximum f1-score is 0.104, that is
worse than the minimum achieved by the pre-trained and the fine-tuned model. This was largely expected, as a model
trained from scratch on a smaller dataset only learns a limited number of patterns.
6.3 SameDomain Test
Table 5. Results on SameDomain Datset for SameDomain Test.
Prec. Rec. f1
TransformerPT (w/o Fine-tuning) 0.200 0.166 0.181
Transformer Fine-tuned 0.240 0.202 0.220
Transformer Scratch 0 0 0
SameDomain Dataset. We compiled busybox-1.31.1 with gcc 7.4.0 and all four optimisation levels. From these bina-
ries we obtained 11897 functions that will constitute our fine-tuning Train set. The Test set is composed by coreutils-
2.29 compiled with 9 different compilers and optimization levels from O0 to O3, after processing the functions we
obtained 60770 samples.
Results without fine-tuning. Without fine-tuning TransformerPT has an f1-score of 0.18. Such result is lower than
the one obtained on the Test set of UbuntuDataset. We believe that is due to the fact that this dataset contains multiple
different compiler optimizations, including the O0 that is not frequently used for pre-compiled ubuntu packages (see
also similar explanation for tests in previous section).
Results with fine-tuning. We fine-tuned the model re-training it for 5 epochs. With fine-tuning we got an overall
increment of 4 points, the f1-score reaches the value of 0.22. This corresponds to a relative improvement of perfor-
mances of around 22% with respect to the pre-trained model. This confirms that fine-tuning is a good strategy when
the naming has to be performed on applications of a certain specific domain.
Results when training from scratch. When the model is trained from scratch we reach a f1-score of 0. This is
because the model incorrectly learns to associate any function to an empty name. This is probably due to the fact that
the training set is too small to learn any meaningful relationships.
9 clang-3.8, clang-3.9, clang-4.0, clang-5.0, gcc-3.4, gcc-4.7, gcc-4.8, gcc-4.9, gcc-5
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7 Test on Malware
We tested the Transformer architecture on real world malware. We performed a quantitative evaluation on linux mal-
ware obtained from Virus-share (Section 7.1), and a qualitative analysis on two malware for which the source code is
available (Section 7.2).
7.1 Quantitative Evaluation
In this section we describe our quantitative evaluation on malware.
Table 6. Results on MalwareDataset. singleton represents all samples that where not labelled byAVCLASS. others groups the
families containing only one sample.
chinaz dnsamp drtycow gafgyt intfour ladvix mirai snessik sotdas yangji znaich singleton others
Number of samples 4 12 5 217 3 2 17 3 4 3 7 57 11
TransformerPT (w/o Fine Tuning) 0.119 0.122 0.282 0.156 0.404 0.356 0.124 0.302 0.105 0.141 0.119 0.221 0.103
Transformer Fine Tuned 0.551 0.463 0.582 0.914 0.864 0.667 0.577 0.857 0.492 0.933 0.581 0.435 0.401
Transformer Scratch 0.401 0.331 0.560 0.870 0.772 0.571 0.455 0.857 0.346 0.910 0.440 0.194 0.280
MalwareDataset. We built a dataset of malware downloading an ELF collection from Virus-share 10. To have a
reliable ground-truth we only considered malware that are not stripped. Moreover, we selected only the malware for
AMD64. We used VirusTotal11 to obtain the antivirus labels for each selected sample. We used AVCLASS [21] to
assign a family to each sample. At the end of this process we obtained 406 malware belonging to 23 families. The
families are very unbalanced, the majorities of samples (217) belongs to the class gafgyt, 11 families contains only one
sample, and 57 samples were classified from AVCLASS as SINGLETON. We disassembled all samples with IDA Pro
and we filtered function names using the procedure and the vocabulary described in Section 4. In total, we gathered
156316 functions.
Test Description and Dataset Split. We will perform three kind of tests: one taking the Transformer architecture
trained on the UbuntuDataset (namely TransformerPT) as it is; another in which we fine-tune the trained architecture
by performing a small re-train on a Training set that we will describe later; and, a final one where we used the same
aforementioned Training set to train a Transformer model from scratch. The Training set contains the 61 samples of
tsunami family, the remaining samples are used for Test set. We decided to use a rather limited Training set to model
a worst case scenario where there are only few malware that can used to build a labeled dataset.
Results. The results of our tests are in Table 6.
Tests without fine-tuning. We tested TransformerPT on the MalwareDataset. The average f1-score for all the classes
is 0.196 and it is lower than the one on the UbuntuDataset (f1-score of 0.230). However, as we already mentioned
this f1-score is possibly underestimating the real performance by predicting names that are meaningful but not exactly
equal to the ones in the dataset. This hypothesis is confirmed by our qualitative analysis in Section 7.2.
Tests with fine-tuning. We fine-tuned the TransformerPT model already trained on UbuntuDataset using Malware-
Dataset Training set. We stopped the retrain after 43 epochs when the performance on the Training set where not
improving any more. The fine tuned model clearly shows the benefits of a domain specific fine-tune. We reached
an f1-score of 0.640. We think that during the fine-tuning the network learns the specific domain, that is constituted
mainly by encryption functions, network functions, IO operations, functions that gather informations from the OS and
statically linked libraries.
10 https://tracker.virusshare.com:7000/torrents/VirusShare ELF 20190212.zip.REDACTED
11 www.virustotal.com
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Training the model from scratch. We also used the same Training set to train a Transformer from scratch. Interestingly,
this model reaches an high f1-score. We argue that this is due to the code reuse between different families and static
linking. As a matter of fact while the Transfromer trained from scratch achieve good performance on certain families
(gafgyt intfour,snessik), it performs markedly worse, with respect to the fine-tuned model, on others. As an example
on the singleton group the from scratch model reaches an f1-score of 0.194 (vs. pre-trained transformer 0.221), while
the fine tuned model reaches an f1-score of 0.401.
7.2 Qualitative Evaluation on Malware
We performed a qualitative evaluation on the infamous botnet MIRAI, for which source code has been leaked 12, and
on the educational ransomware gonnacry 13. We decided to use malware for which the source code was available in
order to manually asses each prediction by looking also at the original source code. Our hypothesis is that the f1-score
is underestimating the performance of the pre-trained TransformerPT. We will show that the prediction of our model
can provide to a reverse engineer some useful insights on a stripped binary.
Analysis of Predictions on the Mirai Botnet. We compiled the botnet from the source code with optmization O0
and gcc-7.4. We disassembled it using IDA Pro obtaining 74 functions. We report in Table 7 the comparison of
reference, prediction of TransformerPT and DEBIN. The value of the f1-score computed on such predictions is 0.157
forTransformerPT and 0.013 for Debin. We identified the following interesting aspects:
– Networking and Checksum functions: all networking functions are associated with a set of tokens related
to network functionalities, that is usually composed by send, send to or send request, we highlight tear-
down connection (row 35) that is correctly named as closed. The function checksum generic (row 23) is
correctly named as crc.
– String and memory related: The function mem exists (row 8) looks for a string in a buffer, and it is named
str cmp, another example is util memseach (row 60) that is named as find and it also finds a string in memory.
Functions that check if a string is in a particular format or if a character is in a particular format are almost correctly
predicted (e.g. util isupper (row 64) is named in is low).
– File Operations: The function killer kill by port (row 27) finds the process listening on a certain port by read-
ing from the proc filesystem. In this case, our model predicts process read dir that correctly represent part its
behaviour. The function has exe access (row 28) opens the file /proc/[pid]/exe, in our model the functions is
named as read pid file. The function memory scan match (row 29) search for a certain string in a file, our model
predicts get from file.
– Other functions: The function attack kill all (row 2) is translated in kill all, by looking at the code the function is
iterating on an array of PIDs and killing each process in the array. The function attack start (row 4) is starting a
set of child processes, and it is correctly identified as run child. In attack get opt str (row 5) a value is searched
in an array, and this is correctly named as find. attack get opt ip (row 7) returns an ip address and this is named
as addr by our network. The function add attack (row 8) performs a reallocation of an array incrementing its
size and it adds an element, the network predicted name add fits this behaviour.
Analysis of Predictions of Gonnacry. We report in Table 8 the comparison of reference, prediction of TransformerPT
and DEBIN. The value of f1-score for DEBIN predictions is 0.0825while the transformer reaches an f1-score of 0.260.
On this malware the predictions are rather good and even when they differ from the ground truth, they still express sub-
behaviours implemented in the function. get desktop environment (row 12) is predicted as get path, interestingly,
such function returns the desktop path. Other interesting examples are the functions decrypt/encrypt (rows 23, 24),
what they do is to open a file copying its encrypted/decrypted contend in another file, the Transformer names such
functions as copy file. The function generate key (row 15) creates a random string and it is named as random.
12 https://github.com/jgamblin/Mirai-Source-Code
13 https://github.com/tarcisio-marinho/GonnaCry
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Table 7. Prediction of the Transformer and DEBIN on mirai
Row # Reference Transformer Prediction Debin Prediction Description
1 attack init emit load tnt list at call another functions multiple times
2 attack kill all kill all kill faio read process id from array and kill process
3 attack parse set globus gsi cert utils get x509 name parse a command packet
4 attack start run child jed fork monitor start processes using fork
5 attack get opt str find err ssl find a string in an hashmap
6 attack get opt int get fprintf chk get an integer in a dictionary
7 attack get opt ip addr shutdown get an ip address from a dictionary
8 add attack add tnt tuple add reallocate more space for an array and adds an element
9 free opts free get mod mask for executes several frees
10 attack app proxy operator globus i ftp client plugin notify symlink flooding packets
11 attack app http sec key main flooding packets
12 attack app cfnull send request mitm child flooding packets
13 attack gre ip send Multicast receive socket flooding packets
14 attack gre eth send request Multicast send socket flooding packets
15 attack tcp syn send request Unicast send socket flooding packets
16 attack tcp ack send sendfile tcp stream flooding packets
17 attack tcp stomp send query mndp flooding packets
18 attack udp generic send request Unicast receive socket flooding packets
19 attack udp vse send InitNetwork flooding packets
20 attack udp dns send request openSocket flooding packets
21 attack udp plain send establish control internal flooding packets
22 get dns resolver read do verify password read from the table the dns address or use a random dns
23 checksum generic crc fwrite compute a generic checksum function
24 checksum tcpudp cmp LogError compute checksum for tcp upd packets
25 killer init send to OpenSocket open a socket
26 killer kill kill process jed lock file kill a process using pid
27 killer kill by port process read dir create lockspace finds a process listening on a port by reading on the proc fs
28 has exe access read pid file tty create lock try to open /proc/[pid]/exe
29 memory scan match get from file blacklisted key in file read data from file and check for matches
30 mem exists str cmp debug check if a string is contained in a buffer
31 main handle connection handle a connection with sockets
32 anti gdb entry code expr new display option dialog popup assign to a pointer the location of a function
33 resolve cnc addr get hash do read file dns query to resolve c&c server
34 establish connection socket connect connect proxy create a connection with sockets
35 teardown connection close pw extauth check close a connection
36 ensure single instance socket ntpdatemain check for a single connection
37 unlock tbl if nodebug format dStrHexStr dynamic call to init table
38 rand init hash image loaded cb initialize random generator
39 rand next key hash perror generate a random number
40 rand str str freeaddrinfo generate a random string
41 rand alphastr encode SocketClient create generate a random string
42 resolv domain to hostname get mnt closeclnt parse a domain to find subdomain
43 resolv skip name utf decode nfs call umount array search
44 resolv lookup send nfsmount make a dns query, send and receive data with socket
45 resolv entries free free lsh copy file free memory
46 table init gen cmd isra display option dialog apply initialize table
47 table unlock val code expr new lsh get cstring unlock a location in a table
48 table lock val code expr new lsh object alloc lock a location in a table
49 table retrieve val get werror get a value from a table
50 add entry make werror write raw add a new entry in a table
51 toggle obf lib image rgb to rgb verbose obfuscate with xor a location in the table
52 util strlen str len strlen compute the len of a string
53 util strncmp compare parse dir check if 2 strings are equals
54 util strcmp operator smatch check if 2 strings are equals
55 util strcpy add buf strdup copy strings
56 util memcpy put memcpy copy a portion of the memory
57 util zero str trim memcpy chk set a memory portion to zero
58 util atoi py byte stack chk fail local convert a numerical string to an integer
59 util itoa date time to time write convert an integer into a string
60 util memsearch find game set options from defaults find a string in a buffer
61 util stristr find char lsh string data find for a substring
62 util local addr connect nfs callback address open a connection and return an address
63 util fdgets get open control device get data from file
64 util isupper is low globus i ftp client plugin notify utime check if a character is upper case
65 util isalpha is low case globus ftp client pl ugin set connect func check if a character (low. and up. case) is alphabetic
66 util isspace is space globus ftp client operationattr get dcau check if a character is a space
67 util isdigit is digit globus i ftp client feature set check if a character is a digit
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Table 8. Prediction of the Transformer and DEBIN on gonnacry
Row # Reference Transformer Prediction Debin Souce code analysis
1 main write load init file
2 find files scan dir listdir find all files in a given directory
3 create files desktop operator blurb wrapper for other functions
4 save into file files list write file save session write files
5 save into file encrypted list write file make openvpn gui conf write file
6 read from file encrypted files load readRuleFile read from a file and parse its content
7 get filename ext get file extension stack chk fail local get extension of a file
8 get home enviroment get home dir init file name get home path by manipulating string
9 get username get user name archdep default rtc file name return the logged username
10 get trash path new set player name allocate the memory location for a string and manipulate it
11 get media path make path get and append filenames get the path to media by manipulating string
12 get desktop enviroment get path ccParseRule return the Desktop path by manipulating string
13 get test path strdup oldgaa strcopy manipulate a string
14 is path is dir ioutil opendir check if a directory exist
15 generate key random encrypt init generate a random string
16 append add openfile append element to a linked list
17 destro free free screenhack list free the memory of a linked list
18 print print do baro print values in a list
19 length get globus i ftp client plugin notify utime get a value representing list len
20 encrypt files open main open some files
21 decrypt files open file CDE begin execve open some files
22 shred write file connect options overwrite a file with zeros
23 encrypt copy file build encrypt the content from file and save on another
24 decrypt copy file wav merge files encrypt the content from file and save on another
8 Conclusion
This paper proposes a study on the problem of predicting names of functions in stripped binary code. We tested state-
of-the-art solutions in machine translation finding a rather good carryover on our problem. Moreover, we created a
large public dataset of functions that can be used to further the research on the topic. The results that we found are
encouraging, and pave the way for further studies. We believe that many improvements are possible, and that one of
the main challenges is to find faithful metrics that would capture the performances perceived by a human. To this end
it would be beneficial to investigate the following directions:
– Multi-references dataset: an idea is to create a dataset where each function is associated with multiple reference
names. This would ameliorate the evaluation problem since it would take into account the possibility of deviating
from a single canonical name.
– Extensive human evaluation: another line is to perform an extensive investigation using humans. It would be
beneficial to evaluate this kind of solutions using experienced programmers that look at the predicted name and at
the source code of the function.
– Metrics based on NLP: finally, it would be interesting to use metrics based on NLP. Recently, BERTScore [24]
proposes new metrics based on contextual word embedding computed with BERT [9]. The intuition is that this
process takes into account the semantic of the words in the predicted and reference sentences.
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